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and the urban sculpture planning authority in elite coalition in
Shanghai
Jane Zheng
Chinese University of Hong Kong
ABSTRACT
The emergence of an attractive public art scene in urban public areas (termed
urban sculpture in the Chinese context) is a recent phenomenon in Shanghai.
The role of the local state in urban sculpture planning and development has
not been critically examined. This article proposes a model entitled “cultural
elite state” to conceptualize the characteristics of urban sculpture authority.
The main argument is that the cultural capital held by individual political and
social elites has a significant effect on the formation of the cultural elite
coalition that influences decision making and execution in urban sculpture
planning in Shanghai. First, the glue effect of cultural capital, rather than
institutional arrangements, creates the cultural elite coalition. Second, actors
in the cultural elite coalition are characterized with similar cultural disposition
of “legitimate tastes” and art participation. Third, with the effect of cultural
capital, the field of cultural development displays a relatively higher degree of
autonomy, in which cross-hierarchy and cross-sector communication and
mediation take place. Thus, the urban sculpture planning authority operates
in a cultural elite coalitionmore as a loosely organized hierarchy of officers with
individual cultural dispositions than as a solitary governing entity.
The role of the state in China’s urban development has traditionally been a major issue in Chinese
urban studies. Since 1994, local governments have gained fiscal autonomy and an array of adminis-
trative powers, which led to increased importance of localities and places (Savitch & Kantor, 2002; H.
K. Wang & Li, 1997; Yeh & Wu, 1999; J. T. Zhang, 2005). Terms such as growth coalition and growth
machine are coined to describe the state that operates a place as a business in coalition with the private
sector or one that transforms a place into a lure that attracts investment (H. K. Wang & Li, 1997; F. L.
Wu, 2000). The concept of “local state corporatism” compares local governments to entrepreneurs and
their prodevelopment strategies to corporatist strategies and highlights the importance of local
economic regimes; that is, local entrepreneurial cadres (Naughton, 1995; Walder, 1994; J. Wang,
1995).1 Duckett (1998) captures the shifts from an interventionist to a more entrepreneurial regime
and develops Blecher’s (1991) model of “entrepreneurial state.” It characterizes state officers’ engage-
ment in upgrading city images by providing assorted attractions in the urban landscape to attract
tourists and visitors. These strategies aim at producing profits to boost the city’s economy and to
produce profits for bureaus. Zheng (2010) adjusts this model by highlighting the competition among
district governments and the discrepancies between various government levels, which weaken the
efficiency of the local state as a place promoter. Liu (2012) tests the applicability of a number of
concepts (e.g., world city, cyber city, dual city, hybrid city, and sustainable city) and introduces the
concept of a developmentalist state.
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However, these concepts mainly look at the role of the state in economic and land development.
Cultural development in China, which is an emerging area with rising significance, has recently
attracted scholarly attention. Some scholars probe the way in which culture has been used as a strategic
instrument in China’s urban development through urban planning and management (Yang & Chang,
2007; Y. Zhang, 2008). The evolution of a cultural map of Shanghai, which includes cultural venues
and facilities, reveals the unique positioning of Shanghai as a global cultural metropolis (W. P. Wu,
2004). The city images that model architecture designs in Europe and the United States are examined
to understand place marketing strategies associated with the middle-class lifestyle (Pow & Kong, 2007;
Ren, 2008; Wai, 2006). Other studies examine creative industry clusters in China and argue for the
driving role of these clusters in revalorizing property values (He & Gebhardt, 2013; Keane, 2011; Kong,
Gibson, Khoo, & Semple, 2006; O’Connor & Gu, 2006, 2014; Zheng, 2010, 2011; Zhong, 2010). Despite
the rising academic interest in cultural development, urban sculpture planning, as an integral part of
China’s urban planning system, has not yet been explored.
This research aims to develop an understanding of the role of the state in urban sculpture planning
and development in Shanghai. Public art entered the purview of urban planning in Europe as the major
focus of the urban regeneration program under the government’s auspices in the late 1970s. Public art
was traditionally used as an educational or didactic instrument, not least as a monument, and has been
incorporated into the government’s initiatives or community grassroots movements in recent decades
(Cork, 1991; M. Miles, 1989, 1998). In Shanghai, sculptures emerged in public spaces during the
Republican period when returning Chinese expatriate artists imported the concept of sculpture from
the West. The development of the art scene was disrupted by the succeeding wars and the Communist
Party’s political movements. This movement, however, revived and prospered in the 1980s. In 1986,
180 sculptures were recorded and increased to 600 in the 1990s (Zhu, 1987). The growing quantity of
urban sculptures is consistent with large-scale urban development. According to The Master Plan for
Urban Sculptures in Shanghai enacted in 2004, approximately 5,000 sculptures will have been erected
in public spaces in Shanghai by 2020 (Anonymous, 2007; Shanghai Municipal Government, 2003b). In
a few iconic sculpture projects—for example, the Shanghai International Sculpture Space and the
Shanghai Expo—the state-initiated collection of sculpture design proposals led to a high profile of
urban sculpture. Thus, urban sculpture (chengshi diaosu) has become a prevailing topic in Shanghai
(Xiang & Yun, 2004). Zheng (2014) clarifies urban sculpture as a term coined and tailored specifically
to the Chinese ideological context and refers to state-sponsored sculptures that are designed and
installed for publicly accessible spaces. Urban sculptures in China have a narrow function, such as
narrating the Party-endorsed history of the nation or city and decorating the environment for aesthetic
pleasure. Urban sculpture, however, excludes multiple genres of public art that are defined in Western
public art theories (Lacy, 1995). Moreover, the relationship between urban sculpture and sites is
affirmative (being either decoration of a site or state-led hegemony) instead of critical.
This research seeks answers to the following questions: What are the characteristics of the urban
sculpture authority, and how does the urban sculpture planning authority operate? How does it make
decisions and fulfill sculpting tasks? To address these questions, this research explores the institutional
bases of the cultural elite coalition, as well as the participating actors and the decision-making
processes. This study innovatively proposes a theoretical framework called cultural elite state, which
is rooted in the sociological theories of cultural capital and elites and is adaptively applied to the
Chinese context. This study particularly highlights the role of a group of sculpture officials and art
consultants (e.g., intellectuals, media workers, and artists, termed nongoverning elites) in loose coali-
tion that facilitates the party-state to produce ideological components and meet its economic goals.
The cultural capital held by these actors bonds actors together and creates the cultural elite coalition. In
this way, it affects the decision-making process and enhances the autonomy of the cultural develop-
ment arena in Shanghai.
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Developing the concept of the “cultural elite state”
A new theoretical concept of the cultural elite state has been formulated. This section begins with a
review of the theoretical foundation of this concept in the tradition of sociological studies. Next, this
concept is characterized in three dimensions: institution, actor, and process. Finally, the applicability
of this concept in the Chinese context is tentatively assessed.
The model of cultural elite state is embedded in sociological studies of culture and elites. Culture
within the pattern of social structure is studied by considering cultural production (e.g., knowledge
production, the arts and sciences, news, and books) and cultural producers as two major focuses
(Coser, Kadushin, & Powell, 1982; Gans, 1979; Kadushin, 1976; Savage & Williams, 2008). A
dematerialization process in recent decades has led to the reassessment of symbolic and cultural
factors (e.g., individual characteristics) in restructuring a class in British analyses of social mobility.
As the form of wealth transforms, privilege values quality over quantity and culturally valued
products over materially valued products. It is embodied in the form of cultural and symbolic
capital (Shipman, 2004). Bourdieu (1979/1987) specifies cultural capital as attitudes, preferences, and
manner of behavior (e.g., cultural practices and norms). It can be measured by cultural tastes and
cultural participation (Katz-Gerro, 2008; Lamont & Lareau, 1988). Cultural capital is viewed as the
source of cultural elite’s power, which is embedded in individuals’ dispositions and judgmental
competencies (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Here, the notion of cultural disposition is a form of
aesthetic appreciation identified with innate variables (e.g., intelligence) and is created by a trained
capacity cultivated through family-based transgenerational education (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996;
Ljunggren, 2015). A circle of cultural elites is formed as people with similar cultural tastes and
behavior patterns group together. In other words, access to groups of elites is restricted solely to
those who hold similar capitals (Bourdieu, 1996). Through this cultural process, cultural capital
creates the path toward the production and reproduction of social elites as the outcome of social
mobility (Bourdieu, 1984; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1999; Lareau & Weininger, 2003; Saunders, 1995;
Savage & Egerton, 1997; Savage, Warde, & Devine, 2007; Zimdars, Sullivan, & Heath, 2009).
The theory of elites has a long tradition in sociological research and is focused on the composition
of power relations and the exclusion and inclusion of social groups in the power structure (Griffiths,
2008). The existence of elites reflects an incomplete democracy, economic polarization, and social
hierarchies with a significant divide between elite and the people in Europe and America. These
societies are characterized by a ruling minority that dominates the social structure and comprises social
elites with higher social esteem and influence (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1901/1999). In some former
communist countries (e.g., Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovenia), old and new elites coexist and have
undergone the process of modernization (F. Adams & Tomsic, 2002). In both systems of society, the
term cultural elites refers to elite actors who influence cultural production (Graglia, 2004; Ljunggren,
2015; Skjott-Larsen, 2012). In the Chinese context, political officers are called elites (Opper, Nee, &
Brehm, 2015) or party elites (Choi, 2012; Shih, Adolph, & Liu, 2012). Cultural elite state is a new term
to be introduced to the literature of China studies.
The elite theory explains who governs. Pareto (1920) maintains that a society includes two types of
people, namely, those who rule (the elite) and those who are ruled (the nonelite). The elite can be
divided into those who rule directly (referred to as a governing elite) and those who rule indirectly
(referred to as a nongoverning elite) as a dichotomy. The former holds political power, whereas the
latter exerts power in nonpolitical spheres mostly by informing and directing political power and
mobilizing the public (Scott, 1985, 1991, 1997). The nongoverning elite can be described as those who
possess high levels of cultural capital but inadequate economic power for purchasing cultural objects
(Bourdieu, 1984). Their creative and strategic ways (with cultural distinction) of mobilizing the masses
to accept certain values or attributes defines the legitimacy of their power.
Three components underpin the concept of the cultural elite state, namely, institutions, actors,
and the operational processes.
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Cultural elites have traditionally been active in established organizations or clearly structured institu-
tions for cultural production; for example, research institutions, universities, news agencies, local
governing organizations, and legislatures (Rado, 1982). They have beenworking with the state to entwine
themselves with state institutions and build institutions and expand their remit and claim jurisdiction
over the “apparatus of cultural governance” (Griffiths,Miles, & Savage, 2008, p. 192). Cultural elites in the
United States are not confined within the scope of formally structured settings or clearly defined
disciplines, communities, or organizations. Rather, they could be working in an emergent informal
multidisciplinary network of various social organizations and processes; for example, communal cultural
associations. They are also involved in problem-solving cultural tasks embedded in social relations
(DiMaggio, 1982; Rado, 1982). The class subjectivities of the cultural elite themselves are weak, and the
cultural demarcation of this group is vague (Ljunggren, 2015; Scott, 2008).
In communist/former communist countries, the institutional bases of cultural elites are mostly
state-subsidized/backed semi-official organizations or state institutions; for example, performing arts
associations, writers’ unions, and academic institutions; however, many of the cultural elites main-
tain their professional identities and become institutionally in between the state and the society.
Cultural elites maintain certain autonomy in terms of interests associated with their professions and
commitments to their work (L. Adams, 2004).
Despite institutional affiliation, it can be hypothesized that cultural elites are tied together more by
similar cultural capitals than institutional bases (e.g., similar cultural tastes and preference for cultural
participation, similar conditions of existence and competences, as well as similar trajectories and cultural
practices; Bourdieu, 1984). People with these features are most likely to generate chemistry or an
emotional spark of commonality at the initial meeting because they may share similar conditions
(Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). A discovery of such similarities serves as a powerful emotional glue that
facilities trust and comfort and bonds people together in excitement (Collins, 2004; Gigone & Hastie,
1993). Cultural fit is a formal evaluative criterion in hiring, in which evaluators construct and assess merit
in their own image (Lamont, 1992; Rivera, 2012). Consequently, aesthetic tastes generated by disposi-
tions shape social distinction and create visible social boundaries (Bourdieu, 1984; Douglas & Isherwood,
1979; Holt, 1998; Veblen, 1899/1960, 1899/1994). This informal politics institutionalizes power relations
and gathers people together with similar beliefs, values, and attitudes (Tsou, 1995).
Actors of cultural elitism have undergone limited evolution across decades. Before the 1960s, cultural
elites in the United States largely referred to professors, scholar-teachers (or the intellectuals and social
elites), or intellectuals. Cultural elites come from a variety of professions, including the academia in
universities, physicians, lawyers, trustees on the board of art institutions, ethics, priests, and entertain-
ment cadre that oversee media (Hanson, 2010; Himmelfarb, 1999; Ostrower, 2002; Rado, 1982).
Harvard’s list of cultural elite listed 100 people, including writers, publishers, literary agents, or those
who were somehow involved in the publishing world (Anonymous, 1992).2 Cultural elites hold political
power and participate in the process of state policy making. Bourdieu (1993) emphasizes the cultural
elites’ association with the relatively autonomous field of culture and power and represents a class of
social and economic dominance (known as “aristocratically intellectual group” in the United Kingdom
[Shils, 1955, p. 12] and the upper echelons that run government departments in the United States
[Hanson, 2010]). In the United States, cultural elites are labeled as the “knowledge” or “verbal” class,
whose only tools and products are words because they focus mostly on their potential to affect policy
making and people’s way of thinking (Himmelfarb, 1999; Scott, 2008).
The tastes of these actors have undergone transition in the recent decades. Cultural elites no longer
exclusively hold highbrow tastes; rather, they possess an added eclectic cultural taste as opposed to
highbrow univores, described as “legitimate taste,” embedded in an individual elite’s cultural disposition
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 52). These actors have become inclusive and broad as the cosmopolitan elites. This
transformation of cultural omnivorousness among the elite results from the effect of education with eclectic
and global tastes not tied to either the local place or people (Brooks, 2000).
In terms of processes, cultural elites exert influences in making and implementing decisions. In
Uzbekistan, for instance, the party-state has little tolerance for diversity of political expression or
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dissident activity, and the regime ensures its support with ideological instruments (L. Adams, 2004).
Political communication consists mainly of one-way transmission of ideology from state to citizens and
the latter passively receive information and are unified by deceptive public discourses. Cultural elites are
working closely with the state to conduct politics on a symbolic level. They are in a coercive relationship
with the state and aim to promote the domination of the state over the shared meaning of the concepts
related to collective cultural patrimony, using propaganda and other ideological instruments to facilitate
the government to enhance social solidarity and promote state legitimacy (L. Adams,2004). Thus, using
the service of cultural elites is a symbolic strategy (Bourdieu, 1996). Cultural elites affirm the role they
play in supporting the regime, and they please their political leaders without intent to transform the
authoritarian state. They are not independent thinkers but partially play with nation-building projects to
serve the ideological goals of the state (L. Adams, 2004).
In this process, cultural elites are not simply transmitting the words of the government but are also
exploiting their autonomy within the state to exert their influences on their own interests (L. Adams,
2004). With Pareto’s (1920) framework, these cultural elites can be conceptualized as nongoverning
elites. The unique role of cultural elites is to mediate state–society relations. They retain their status,
composition, and power by integrating valuable skills into initiatives to prevent conflicts between groups.
Accordingly, they may create alternative unforeseen consequences that potentially deviate from the
direction of the state. Essentially, they fail to provide any real aid to people searching for meaningful
belief systems, and their creativity and art demands are restrained within the limitation of the ideological
context (Pareto, 1901/1991).
The cultural elite state concept is tentatively applicable to the Chinese context because it could be
connected to the ongoing discourse of the role of the party-state. The concept of entrepreneurial-style
authoritarian state describes the post-Maomarket-oriented reforms that caused the transition of the state
from totalitarianism to authoritarianism (Liu, 2012; F. L. Wu, 2007; J. Zhang, 2013). The authoritarian
state holds highly concentrated and centralized power on the one hand and selectively withdraws itself in
some aspects on the other hand; this process allows for deeper engagement of a broadened professional
executive and consultancy body (J. Zhang, 2013). In Chinese studies, the term elite state describes the
prodevelopment coalition of political, economic, and intellectual elites who work at the top level of the
state (Ma, 2009). Shin (2013) observes that the expansion of China’s political landscape is strongly
associated with a particular urban vision held collectively by local elites. The effect of cultural capital is
also hypothetically applicable to China. According to Opper et al. (2015), leadership promotion in
China’s political elite relies on homophily in the form of joint origin, education, and work experience.
Research methods
Qualitative research methods are most effective in exploring the nature and characteristics of an
authority. Nonprobability purposeful sampling is used to achieve the representativeness or typicality
of urban sculpture planning authority (Maxwell, 2005) to identify individuals and cases that could
provide the most relevant and adequate information for in-depth interviews and case studies. The author
interviewed two chief officials (one current and one retired) at the current municipal urban sculpture
planning authority and the former chairperson of the Art Association, all of the chief officials in charge of
urban sculpture tasks in the 10 district urban planning authorities, and six officials in other district
government departments. A similar sampling method was applied in selecting art experts in the Art
Committee. Twenty interviews were conducted with Art Committee members, including art experts and
artists who actively participated in state-led projects. Twenty-one case studies were conducted; these
cases studies were urban sculpture projects with deep involvement of district or municipal planning
authorities. The government partners, which include the business sector and the nonprofit sector, in
these projects were interviewed.
Semistructured in-depth questions were used to elicit answers in interviews with the government
officials. Detailed information about the interview subjects and questions can be found in the
Appendix. Site reconnaissance was adopted to facilitate the case studies.
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Data analysis in qualitative research follows the principle of “custom-built, revised, and choreo-
graphed” (Creswell, 1994, p. 142). The analyses began with reading the interview transcripts,
observational notes, and written and site analysis documents and then proceeded to making notes
and memos. Theoretical categorizing was then performed by coding these notes and memos.
The urban sculpture planning authority in elite coalition in Shanghai
The main argument of this research is that cultural capital (held by individual elites) significantly
influences the formation of the cultural elite coalition, which shapes decision making and execution in
the urban sculpture development in Shanghai. The new model of cultural elite state characterizes
cultural elites in three aspects. First, the institutional bases for cultural elites are state-backed or semi-
official organizations or state institutions subject to the indigenized policy context. In Shanghai, the
term cultural elite state is created to conceptualize local cultural development authority that adopts
urban entrepreneurial policies. However, this elite coalition is created by a similar cultural capital
instead of institutional arrangements. Second, the cultural elite coalition engages sculpture officials of
the municipal urban sculpture committee and a wide range of art-related professionals who hold
legitimate tastes. Third, cultural elites mediate the party-state, artists, and the public and serve to meet
the political and economic goals of the state.
From the artists’ association to the urban planning bureau: The institutional bases the urban
sculpture authority in formation
Cultural elites in the sculpture sector are based on semi- or fully state-backed cultural organizations
and institutions. The process of institution building is found to involve policy transition. Conversely,
forming the cultural elite coalition is not created by institutional connections but is affected by a
similar cultural capital.
Institutional foundation and transition of the Urban Sculpture Planning Authority
Consistent with the theory on the institutional foundation of cultural elites, the transition of urban
sculpture authority from the Artists’ Association–led model to the Urban Sculpture Planning
Authority–led model mirrored the shift in urban policy toward prodevelopment urban entrepre-
neurialism in Shanghai.
The Artists’Association (Meixie) was in charge of urban sculpture projects from the 1950s to the 1980s.
It was established as a state-backed semi-official organization, mimicking its counterpart in the Soviet
Union as an embodiment of the Communist Party’s direct leadership and control over the art sector. The
duties of this association ranged from coordinating artists’ participation in state-led urban sculpture
projects to setting up artistic criteria and exercising politics through leadership (interview with the ex-
head of the Artists’ Association, December 16 & 23, 2013). Most sculptures produced through this system
were didactic monuments that affirmed the dominant political values of the Communist Party.
Representative artworks are monuments of historical figures. The statue of Marx and Engels in Fuxing
Park, the statue of SongQingling, and the group statues of martyrs in LonghuaMartyrs’ Park are examples.
The succeeding shift in the focus of policy and its influences on institutional transition and building
are evident. In the late 1970s, in line with the central government, the Shanghai government adopted
prodevelopment policies to advance urban entrepreneurialism through planning and urban design.
Urban sculptures were no longer solely value-laden political didactic objects but also aesthetic objects
for urban beautification. The first sculpture project from the perspective of urban development was
during the Shanghai government’s plan to redesign the People’s Square and decorate it using sculptures.
The Artists’ Association submitted a proposal aimed at advancing the development of urban sculptures;
this proposal was endorsed by the Central Government Publicity Department (No. 90) on July 12, 1982.
In 1982, Zhao Ziyang, the premier of the State Council, endorsed the Artists’ Association’s proposal for
commissioning the Cultural Bureau and Cultural Ministry and Artists’ Association to supervise urban
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sculpture projects with the assistance of the Construction Bureau. He suggested merging this organiza-
tion as a functional part with the Urban Planning Bureau in the Construction Ministry (Central
Government Publicity Ministry, 1987). In response to this national policy, a state-backed organization
known as the Urban Sculpture Planning Group3 was established under the direct leadership of the vice
mayor in charge of urban development in Shanghai. This organization supervised the planning and
management for urban sculpture projects (Urban Sculpture Policy Document, No. 0008, 1982). During
that period, approximately 50 sculptures were produced and installed in public spaces every year. In
1985, the Urban Sculpture Planning Group was upgraded to the Urban Sculpture Committee (USC;
Chengshi diaosu weiyuanhui) under the leadership of the municipal Publicity Department and
Construction Commission. In its second year, the municipal USC (MUSC) set up the Art Committee
(yishu weiyuanhui). According to the official document entitled Urban Sculpture Construction and
Management Methods (issued by the Cultural Ministry and Construction Ministry, 1993), the two
ministries collaboratively worked together in overseeing the nationwide sculpture development; in
local areas, the Cultural Ministry implements cultural policies, whereas the Construction Ministry
facilitates the planning, construction, and management of the urban sculpture projects (Cultural
Ministry and Construction Ministry, 1993). The USC assists authorities in managing and coordinating
urban sculpture-related affairs in nationwide areas. In 1990, Zhu Rongji, the city mayor of Shanghai,
issued a directive stating that “Shanghai should develop urban sculpture” (Xu, 2004). Following this
directive, an office was set up under the MUSC called MUSCO (Municipal Urban Sculpture Committee
Office).
The complete handover of urban sculpture planning to the Urban Planning Bureau took place within
the new development-oriented context of urban entrepreneurialism. The focus of the policy was
upgrading urban images and boosting property-led real estate development through planning.4 The
MUSC andMUSCOweremerged into the Urban Planning Bureau in 2003. Consistent with China’s two-
tier urban planning system (F. L. Wu, 2007; Yeh & Wu, 1999), the urban sculpture planning system
includes two tiers. The first tier is the urban sculpture master plan conducted byMUSCO and the second
one is the detailed urban sculpture master plan by DUSCO (District Urban Sculpture Committee Office;
or Landscape and Historic Conservation Section in district planning bureaus if DUSCO does not exist).
The urban sculpture plan at the municipal level5 is a concept plan that proposes the total number of
sculptures within the planning period and the iconic pattern of their distribution in the city. The DUSCO
in the planning bureau at the district level takes charge of more detailed arrangements in the form of
regulatory detailed plans (kongzhi xing xiangxi guihua), which allocate sculpture tasks to specific land
plots (interview with senior officials in MUSCO, February 7, 2013). In addition to making urban
sculpture plans, MUSCO implements key projects. MUSCO takes charge of three categories of urban
sculpture projects: (a) key projects assigned by the municipal political leaders; for example, the city
mayor or chief secretary; (b) cross-district projects6; and (c) sculpture projects located in 12 accredited
historic quarters (Changning District Urban Planning and Design Institute and Tuji University Art and
Design Department, 2007).
This initiative of setting up the two-tier planning system indicates the recognition of urban
sculpture planning as a specialized task in urban development. However, this cultural sector is not
placed on equal footing with the rest of the mainstream urban planning system. Urban sculpture
planning is a special add-on cultural component of less importance, being merged into the mainstream
urban planning system. Financially, it is separate from other parts of the bureau and is devoid of
regular funding allocation and other resources. The MUSC relies on special funding (zhuanxiang
bokuan) of RMB 10million that was allocated in 2003. In terms of accounting, no line item has been set
for urban sculpture. No clear guidelines that concern funding allocation for urban sculpture projects
have been set up either. The expenditure needed for devising the urban sculpture plan, enacting key
sculpture projects, and the daily operation of the committee in the years following has relied on this
fund without further injection (interview with government officials in MUSCO, August 8, 2013).
At the district level, 5 out of 10 districts in the central city (zhongxin chengqu) have established a
district Urban Sculpture Committee (DUSC) within the sector of MUSCO for professional and political
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advice. They rely on funding allocation from their respective district governments. The importance of the
urban sculpture planning section in the urban planning bureau varies across districts. The former Luwan
District established the first DUSC that coordinated 14 government agencies and departments; for
example, the Garden and Greenery Department, Education Department, Planning Bureau, Cultural
Bureau, and Bursary Bureau. The former vice head of Luwan District acted as the head of the DUSC and
was tasked with coordinating planning and implementation. In other four districts with DUSC—that is,
Changning, Putuo, Jing’an, and Pudong districts—a Landscape Section (Fengjing Yuanlin Ke) was set up
under the DUSCO. This section is tasked to execute detailed duties related to urban sculpture projects
(interview with government officials in MUSCO, August 8, 2013; Table 1).
Cultural capital that bonds elites together in urban sculpture planning
Shared cultural capital, instead of institutional arrangements, bonds people together; this argument is
consistent with the literature on cultural capital and cultural elite. Shared cultural capital has led to the
formation of a project-based, if not long-term, elite coalition that includes political leaders (ruling elites),
sculpture officials, and art professionals (nonruling elites). One consequence associated with the cultural
capital determining effect is the weak class subjectivity of the cultural elite coalition.
Given its lack of institutionalized decision-making procedures, it largely depends on key party leaders’
personal judgments in deciding whether advice fromMUSCO should be taken. In other words, political
leadership with cultural vision, aesthetic tastes, and art appreciation and understanding is a powerful
impetus for urban sculpture projects to take place. Around 2004, Chen Liangyu7 acted as party secretary.
With a background in architecture and personal aesthetic tastes, he backed urban sculpture development
and allocated RMB 60 million toMUSC. During Chen’s administration, Wu Jiang8 was appointed as the
head of the Planning Bureau. Interviews with officials at the Urban Planning Bureaus show that Wu
Jiang’s personal interest in art and his professional background in historical conservation led to his
dedicated support for urban sculpture planning and projects. Interviewed officials verified that under
Wu Jiang’s leadership, urban sculpture plans were enacted on bothmunicipal and district levels.9 Certain
political leaders in district planning authorities—for example, Jing’anDistrict government—followed the
paragon of the municipal government. They allocated specialized funding (RMB 5 million) to the urban
sculpture sector and assisted in forging closer relationships between the public and private sectors
(interview with an official at the Jing’an District Planning Bureau and businesses, May 23, 2013).
Furthermore, compared with other political leaders, Chen andWu shared a much closer relationship
with officials of MUSCO and art consultants of the Art Committee. Similar to Chan and Wu, the two
chief officials ofMUSCO (who began to work on urban sculpture projects before the institutional merge)
have backgrounds in art teaching and practice in addition to urban sculpture administration.Wu and the
two chief officials share both artistic tastes and experience in art participation. Interviews with 50 people
in this circle reveal that the two chief sculpture officials of MUSCO serve as the magnetic core that
gathered other art consultants, artists, and intellects in the Art Committee, thereby assisting the
formation of an elite coalition. The shared cultural capitals enabled them to break the bureaucratic
hierarchies and disciplinary boundaries and to develop closer personal ties and informal networks by
which they share views on urban sculpture projects. According to the interviews, people in the circle
consider such close ties with the political leaders a privilege and that the outcome was the actualization of
a number of key urban sculpture projects. The Shanghai International Sculpture Space, or the Red Town,
is an iconic example of an urban sculpture project initiated by the municipal Urban Planning Bureau in
collaboration with a private corporation. When Wu stepped down, urban sculpture projects were no
longer prioritized, and no succeeding institution building initiatives were made (interview with an
official at the Jing’an District Planning Bureau, May 23, 2013).
Similarly, individual political leaders’ cultural dispositions work as the decisive factor in initiating
urban sculpture projects at DUSCO. An official of the Huangpu District Planning Bureau10 cited an
example of a sculpture entitled “Ox” (mimicking the Ox sculpture onWall Street) that was installed at the
Financial Plaza at the Bund. The entire process of producing this sculpture, from design to installation,
was under the support and supervision of a vice secretary of HuangpuDistrict. This statue is protected by
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an electronic monitoring camera and a guard. The statue was produced and maintained at a significant
cost, with funds allocated with the support of a deputy district chief (interview with an official at
Huangpu District, December 18, 2013). Thus, officers at MUSCO believe that an ideal model for
advancing state-led urban sculpture projects would involve setting up a committee coordinated by a
major/vice mayor, such as Wu, who understands art and can communicate with art professionals
(interview with the chief official at MUSCO, February 7, 2013).
In addition, during the development of the coalition, connecting governing cultural elites and
nongoverning cultural elites in different fields relies on a similar cultural capital as interpersonal ties.
When Wu Jiang and MUSCO officials selected developers for collaboration on the Shanghai
International Urban Sculpture Center project, the developers’ cultural backgrounds and experience in
cultural projects were seriously considered. Zheng Peiguang’s company was eventually selected as the
partner of the Planning Bureau because of Zheng’s sound professional and academic background in the
arts rather than the financial strength of the company (interviews with Zheng Peiguang, March 3, 2006,
and August 25, 2014). Based on their shared interests in the arts, interpersonal chemistry was elicited and
bonded people together to work on sculpture projects.
The above details show that cultural capital plays a key role in creating the cultural elite coalition.
Political support for urban sculpture projects, the determining factor in the process, is often not the result of
an institutionalized arrangement but of political leaders’ personal cultural dispositions. In other words, the
coincidental marriage of power and cultural disposition enables urban sculpture projects to be actualized.
Actors in the cultural elite state coalition
The composition of the cultural elite coalition in Shanghai urban sculpture planning can be conceptualized
by using concentric circles (Figure 2). The urban sculpture planning authority includes the core cultural
elites, among whom the nongoverning cultural elites have been serving the political and economic goals set
by the governing elites. Consistent with the literature on cultural elites, such elites come from a variety of
art-related professions of practice and consultation. Their distinctive legislative tastes are noted.
Figure 1. The statue of Nie Er, 1980.
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The nongoverning elites involved in the urban sculpture authority are not restricted to government
officials but include a pool of art consultants and sculpture experts in the Art Committee (yishu weiyuan
hui). The Committee has a long-term collaborative relationship with the authority and either provides
consultancy to the political leaders (or governing elites) or conducts urban sculpture projects. Such an
arrangement complements art professionalism by engaging intellectuals, including academics in fine arts–
related subjects (60%), independent artists (18%), art consultants (15%), and others (7%).11 The institu-
tional bases of these members range from state institutions to private corporations; however, all of the
members are deeply involved in state-led sculpture projects. Over the decades, membership has been stable,
although the boundary of this coalition is flexible in principle. The following are some of the committee
members: Tang Shichu is a nationally renowned senior sculptor who is known for his academically realistic
sculptures. He is the earliest member of the Urban Planning Group, serving as a consultant and artist for
urban sculpture planning and projects for 30 years. Yu Jiyong, an established sculptor, worked at the state-
subsidized Oil Painting and Sculpture Academy (Youdiao Yuan) for 20 years and then left the institution
Core cultural elites:
governing cultural
elites: political
leaders holding
cultural capital
Core cultural elites: non‐
governing cultural elites:
officers at the MUSC and
DUSC
Non‐governing cultural elites:
members at the art
committee
Non-governing cultural
elites: media and others
Figure 2. The composition of the cultural elite coalition in urban sculpture planning in Shanghai.
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and operated his own commercial sculpture company. His works have received numerous awards since the
1980s, and he has participated extensively in state-led sculpture projects. Wei Tianyu is a sculptor and
professor at the East Normal University who gained an art education background in the United States. He
was involved in numerous state-led public art and art consultancy projects. He led one of the major urban
sculpture projects in the Shanghai Expo 2010. Zhou Xiaoping is a returning expat artist who operates her
own environment design company and has been active in state-led urban sculpture projects (interviewwith
members of the Art Committee, August 23 andDecember 12–14, 18, 20, 2013). Notably, the governing and
nongoverning elite circles are connected to the media and businesses.
The sculpture officials interviewed in Shanghai exhibited their distinctive cultural disposition in
terms of artistic professionalism, cultural sensibility, dedication to artistic qualities, and sophistica-
tion in maneuvering cultural resources for urban beautification, as well as their legitimate tastes, viz.
local culture–rooted global tastes of eclecticism.
The interviews show that some of the sculpture officials’ understandings of public art is consistent
with that of the international academic literature. For instance, an official of the Huangpu District
Planning Bureau expressed his awareness of the conflicting purpose of the government and the real estate
sector in selecting sculptures. The real estate sector exploits sculpture projects as symbolic resources to
leverage commercial revenues in conformity with the principle that beauty can be profitable. This point is
consistent with scholars’ concerns about the low degree of “publicness”12 in commercial sector-led public
art projects. This official offered the following reflection on public art administration: the current urban
sculpture managerial guidelines in Shanghai cover only those located in publicly accessible areas (out of
the planning red line of properties) under the jurisdiction. However, the degree to which publicness is
derived from the physical location of the statues should bemore related to the psychological feeling of the
audience. He suggests that visually accessible objects within the red line areas on project properties
should also be subject to urban sculpture management guidelines (interview with an official at the
Huangpu District Planning Bureau, December 10, 2013). These concerns are consistent with interna-
tional literature of public art (M. Miles, 1997; M. Miles, Borden, & Hall, 2000; Phillips, 1995).
Practical experience in art and constructive consultancy skills are considered important in the process
of social inclusion of elite consultants. Candidacy screening for the Art Committee excluded those who
are inept at communication despite their abundant art making expertise and theoretical depth. By this
logic, art theorists without practical experience in state-led ventures would not be included (interview
with the ex-head of the Artists’ Association, December 16, 2013). In reality, a large proportion of
sculpture officials in the municipal- and district-level urban sculpture authority has practical experience
in art or design. For instance, the sculpture official at the Pudong Planning Bureau has a background in
fine arts. The district urban sculpture plan for which he was responsible reveals a particular concern with
regard to the relationship of artworks to the sites and their aesthetic qualities. He also set up amechanism
to collect information on emerging urban sculptures both in public spaces and privatized estates
(interview with an official at the Pudong Planning Bureau, May 25, 2013).
In contrast to the gap between the taste of cultural elites and local people in the same contexts as
reported in literature, cultural elites in Shanghai are rooted in local culture. The dominant majority of
sculpture officials and members of the Art Committee are local Shanghaiese. Some interviewees impressed
mewith their dedication to preserving local culture. The former vice head of the LuwanDistrict in charge of
the Luwan District urban sculpture plan, who specializes in assessing and approving construction project
proposals, grew up in LuwanDistrict and has extensive knowledge of its history and culture. In the detailed
urban sculpture plan of Luwan District, sites were selected carefully with particular concerns about their
aesthetic and symbolic qualities. He said that noisy places should not include too many dazzling compo-
nents, whereas quiet sites should avoid tedium. Sculptures were employed to create a sense of dynamism as
a way to symbolize “life in Luwan,” thereby enhancing environmental compatibility (interview with an
official at the Luwan District Planning Bureau, December 18, 2013).
Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996) concept of legitimate taste is applicable to cultural elites in Shanghai because
they have displayed cultural dispositions that appreciate not only the aesthetic criteria of highbrow
culture but also the cultural pattern that marks ordinary people’s lives. Moreover, careful elimination of
JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS 517
explicit political didacticism from these sculptures can be observed. One telling example is a project led
by MUSCO in 2001, which featured 10 winning sculptures installed along Duolun Road that represent a
group of prominent writers who once lived in that area during the 1920s and 1930s. These sculptures
demonstrate high aesthetic attainments along with the Western academic tradition of realism in
representation. However, signs that may indicate heroic or revolutionary monument—for example,
plinths or large-scale sculptures—are cautiously removed. Cultural celebrities are represented as ordin-
ary, life-size people within the context of community-based daily lives, which is a more approachable way
of reproducing the historical scene (Sun, 2006). Such democratizedmonuments associated with ordinary
people’s daily lives have represented one major subject matter in the past 2 decades.
Presumably different from other Chinese cities, the cultural elites in Shanghai have displayed a certain
degree of unique aesthetic tastes in step with the global trend. One example is Yu Jiyong’s iconic artwork
of revolutionary monumentalism entitled “May 30th,” which is representative of abstract modernism
and created in the early 1980s. The two Chinese numerical characters are represented with twining steel
spirals, a modernist artistic language similar to the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao designed by Frank
Gehry (Figure 3) but created 10 years prior. Recent urban sculpture projects—for example, the Shanghai
International Sculpture Center and Jing’an Sculpture Park—are dedicated to introducing contemporary
overseas representative works to Shanghai. Most artworks displayed at the Jing’an Sculpture Park and
International Sculpture Center avoid traditional realistic artistic language. Instead, abstract artistic
language and surrealistic vocabulary with exaggerated representational skills are applied (e.g., works by
Salvador Dalí, Arne Quinze, Barbara Edelstein, and Philippe Hiquily; Figure 4; on-site investigations
from December 2013 to August 2014).
The process: Cross-hierarchy and cross-sector communication and mediation between art,
politics, the public, and urban entrepreneurialism
The main argument about the effect of cultural capital on the formation of an elite coalition can be
supported by the fact that opinions of the district-level sculpture authority are more likely to be
adopted by the municipal authority via in-circle communication. This section argues that the
nongoverning cultural elites at MUSC not only execute directives by the governing elites (as the
cultural elite literature suggests) but also exercise the autonomy of their expertise. These actors
mediate the state, media, and the public; they balance ideological production and artistic quality.
Figure 3. Yu Jiyong, “The Memorial Monument of the May 30th Movement,” 1986.
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Cross-hierarchy “bottom-up” influences on decision making
Because cultural capital affects the formation of the elite circle, the nongoverning cultural elites in
the urban sculpture planning authority enjoy higher autonomy in influencing decision making and
execution. This situation occurs in the context of cross-tier planning structure of governance.
Unlike in the top-down approach of execution in mainstream governmental practices, district-level
sculpture planning authorities have greater discretion in deciding whether the directive from MUSCO
should be adopted. Extra tolerance would be given by the municipal authority. The district planning
authorities often selectively follow the directives given by MUSCO despite their “lip service” in the
sculpture plans (interview with the chief official of MUSCO, February 7, 2013). In one case, the Jing’an
District Planning Bureau declined a sculpture donated by a U.S. sculptor assigned by MUSCO because
the bureau considered the sculpture to be of low artistic quality (interview with the chief official of
MUSCO, February 7, 2013).
Furthermore, advice from the district level (based on practical experience) is more likely to be taken
by MUSCO. Two DUSCO urban sculpture plans were produced prior to the municipal urban sculpture
plan, and this experience provided lessons to MUSCO with regard to planning guidelines and metho-
dology. A typical example is Luwan District, which experimented with a detailed regulatory urban
sculpture plan in 2001. This plan inspired the municipal Urban Sculpture Master Plan13 in the aspects of
plan concepts, the content to be included, and the extent of details (interview with the former head of the
Luwan District Planning Bureau, December 18, 2013). In addition, the Pudong District Planning Bureau
conducted three rounds of sculpture planning. The first round took place in 1998 and had implications
for the municipal plan; the plan selected 20 or 30 sites for inventory and analysis and laid out initial
guidelines for sculpture development (interview with an official at the Pudong District Planning Bureau,
May 25, 2013). To address the difficulty in implementing urban sculpture plans, the Yangpu District
Planning Bureau has been improving the mechanisms; one solution is including the requirement of plan
Figure 4. Urban sculpture at the Jing’an Sculpture Park in Shanghai. Photos offered by the MUSCO, 2014.
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implementation into land lease contracts with private developers (interview with Yangpu District
Planning Bureau official, December 16, 2013; Feburary 24, 2014). Upon recognition of this mechanism,
it will be adopted by the municipal authority. The official in charge of urban sculpture planning in
Yangpu District would be promoted to the municipal level to be responsible for sculpture plan
implementation (interview with the chief official at MUSCO, February 7, 2013).
Mediation between art, power, and urban entrepreneurialism
Consistent with the literature, the nongoverning cultural elites mediate the state, artists, and the
public. They also balance political purposes, artistic qualities, and entrepreneurial urban policies.
The ultimate role of cultural elites is to produce ideological components to secure the power of
the state. An official at the Huangpu District Planning Bureau stated that he carefully executed each
sculpture project assigned by political leaders, from design to interpretative text writing, especially
monuments on the Shanghai Bund. To represent the political and historical significance of the Chen
Yi14 statue, the first Communist city mayor of Shanghai, he spent 2 months studying and composing
the biography of Chen, as inscribed on the plinth (interview with the official at the Huangpu District
Planning Bureau, December 10, 2013).
On another level, sculpture officials who are well versed in both politics and art attempt to protect
artistic qualities from the intervention of political leaders’ unprofessional preferences. The chief
official at MUSCO noted that presenting political leaders with exactly two options of artwork (that
meet art experts’ standards) to decide on the final artwork selection is a workable strategy.15
Consulting more than two authorities can be problematic. In one experience with regard to selecting
the material for a sculpture, officials consulted four authorities; for example, the district government,
the People’s Political Consultative Committees at the district and municipal levels, and the People’s
Congress. Two authorities voted for stainless steel, and two others voted for glass. In reality, glass
was not feasible. This result hindered the project from proceeding. The chief official concluded that
many poor decisions ascribed to political leaders were the result of inadequate communication skills
of sculpture officials (interview with the officials of MUSCO, February 7, 2013). To fulfill duties, they
must be able to handle conflicts between politics and art professionalism.
Moreover, sculpture officials at MUSCO assume the role of mediator, serving to maintain the
state-dominant art selection system, coordinating and communicating with art professionals, and
leading the opinion of the public in coalition with the media (interview with the ex-head of the
Artists’ Association, December 16, 2013). Unsurprisingly, public opinion is shaped in a top-down
manner by the elite coalition. In addition, the goal of public education is to foster an audience of
world-class aesthetics with global tastes. The former chief official at MUSCO provided an iconic
sculpture entitled “Dynamics,” located at the Luoshan Road overpass in Pudong District, as an
example (Figure 5). Installed in the early 1990s, this abstract sculpture in the shape of rising flames
symbolizes the dynamic development of Pudong District. In the early 1990s, the Shanghai public was
not used to appreciating abstract forms of artistic representation (interview with the ex-head of the
Artists' Association, December 16, 2013). A newspaper article reported negative reviews of the
sculpture through a random interview with a cleaning clerk who thought that the sculpture was
difficult to comprehend and looked frightening in the evening. The journalist thus raised a question
of how artwork could be installed in a public space without public consultation. This report
influenced other media to attempt to find answers from MUSCO. The then-head of MUSCO was
interviewed by a number of local TV reporters about the sculpture in question. He answered the
question as follows:
This is one of the iconic public artworks with an abstract style in Shanghai. Diversified artistic representation is
the key characteristic of the city. If the Shanghai people are not tolerant of the abstract artistic style and choose
to stick to the traditional representational style, then how can the city embody the spirit of “embracing
hundreds of rivers into the sea (hai na bai chuan)?” Art follows the incremental principle; many great artworks
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were considered inferior at their inception. It takes time to cultivate the artistic eye of the public. On the second
day, there was a flood of positive reviews about the sculpture. One review said, “This sculpture exemplifies the
exact type of artwork in public spaces that the city wants!” (interview with the former head of the MUSCO,
December 12, 2013; May 5, 2014)
In this case, the undemocratic art selection system was maintained, and the cultural elite promul-
gated diversified modernist artistic styles within the tolerant attitude of the party-state in the context
of entrepreneurial urban beautification programs in Shanghai.
MUSCO officials actively participate in the art circle; they are extensively engaged as consultants
in various public and private urban sculpture projects and thus help to effectively bridge the
government, artists, the business sector, and the public. They advise on artistic representation, the
feasibility of urban sculpture proposals, and the security issues of specific projects.16 An example
involves a Hong Kong company’s sculpture project in the form of a piece of wrapped cut paper.
MUSCO officials advised the client to use two different colors to differentiate the two sides of the
sculpture (interview with a government official at MUSCO, December 16, 2013). Another artwork
with a number of pointed angles in its design was controversial in terms of public safety. The
MUSCO officials advised the company to place it in a fountain, thereby making the sculpture
visually pleasant and physically safe (interview with a government official at MUSCO, December
16, 2013).
The elite coalition is an intermediary between the government and artists. The Art Committee is a
consultancy body that works with MUSC on the panel that selects artworks in two rounds of entry.
Their duties cease when the number of artworks are narrowed down to four in the second round of
Figure 5. Zhao Zhirong, “Dynamics,” 1990.
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selection, thereby leaving the cultural officials and political leaders to decide on selected works
(interview with a government official at the MUSCO, May 5, 2014). The participation of a group of
external experts convinces artists that their works are professionally and fairly assessed rather than
being decided by a single political leader, which was the practice in the past. The artists who
participated in the government-organized projects appeared to trust in the fairness and effectiveness
of the expert selection procedure.
Artworks that do not meet the requirements or are artistically inferior would be taken out. Comments for
revision would be generated and forwarded to the artists through the USCO. The comments for revision and
the decisions are no longer political dictates by a particular political leader. Rather, they are raised by a group of
professionals and experts who understand art. Most comments are not superficial and are communicable to
artists. This is totally unlike processes in the past, when the head of a certain bureau made mandatory but
unprofessional orders for artists to make amendments. Moreover, today’s officials are concerned about public
reception of sculptures. No local government wants to spend money and time making artworks that only elicit
disgust from the public. (Interview with Luo Xiaoping, August 23, 2013)
Conclusion
Recent decades have witnessed a burgeoning number of urban sculptures in diversified artistic styles;
such a flourishing has led to an attractive art scene in Shanghai. This article aims to explore the role
of the state in producing urban sculptures by using the instrument of planning, as exemplified by the
urban sculpture planning authority in Shanghai. This article proposes a new model—that is, the
cultural elite state—which includes the three descriptive components institution, actor, and process
to formulate the characterization of the state in these regards. This new concept is based on the
theories of cultural capital and elites. The leading argument is that shared cultural capital held by
Shanghai political and social elites significantly affects decision making and execution in urban
sculpture planning and development. The cultural elite state model conceptualizes the characteristics
of the state in three aspects: (a) the glue effect of cultural capital (rather than institutionalized
arrangements) creates the elite coalition for urban sculpture projects; (b) actors in the cultural elite
coalition reveal similar cultural dispositions, characterized by legitimate tastes and practical experi-
ence by art participation; and (c) the influences of cultural capital are mirrored in the field of cultural
development, in which cross-tier bottom-up communication and cross-sector mediation take place.
Thus, the urban sculpture planning authority in the cultural elite coalition is less a solitary governing
entity than a loosely organized group of elites with individual cultural dispositions.
This research contributes to filling a knowledge gap in the literature of (a) China’s urban studies
with regard to the role of the state in cultural development in Shanghai and that of (b) cultural elites
by providing a case of urban sculpture planning authority in Shanghai.
In Chinese urban studies, the cultural elite state model is a conceptual innovation with rich
references to the existing literature. The cultural elite state is adherent in nature to the concepts of
authoritarian state and entrepreneurial state. The cultural elite state retains the characteristics of the
authoritarian state in that political leaders make the final decisions to actualize urban sculpture
projects. This new model also embraces the characteristics of the entrepreneurial state in that the
state assumes the planning approach to advance urban entrepreneurialism by developing an attrac-
tive urban image. This research shows that the formation of the urban sculpture planning authority
(undergoing the transition from the Artists’ Association–led model to the municipal Urban Planning
Bureau–led model) indicates the rising importance of entrepreneurial urban strategies apart from
ideological controls in China’s urban policies. This article complements the entrepreneurial state
model with the finding that urban sculpture planning was adopted as a new instrument to upgrade
urban images. The cultural elite state model supplements the authoritarian state model by arguing
that cultural development—urban sculpture planning in particular—is a field that the party-state
selectively withdraws itself from because the cultural elite coalition (as an alternative way of aligning
human resources) is active. On the other hand, the discrete nature of cultural capital embedded in
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individuals’ aesthetic tastes and intellectual levels renders the cultural elite coalition instable. In most
conditions, the coalition is project based and unstable, subject to changes of political leadership.
The cultural elite state concept modeling on the urban sculpture planning authority in Shanghai also
provides theoretical implications to the literature on cultural elites. This research shows that most
theoretical components about cultural elites on the dimensions of institution, actor, and process are
applicable to the Shanghai context. In particular, nonruling elites advance cultural hegemony for the
party-state in the field of urban sculpture and mediate different interested parties. On the one hand,
cultural elites balance producing hegemonic instruments and protecting artistic qualities from political
interferences. On the other hand, they lead public aesthetic cognition in a top-down manner and foster
global aesthetic tastes in the context of urban entrepreneurialism. Variations from the literature in five
aspects with specificities of urban sculptures in Shanghai are highlighted below.
First, compared with cultural elites in other communist countries, the concept of cultural elite state
refers specifically to the cultural development authority in Shanghai in the entrepreneurial urban context.
It not only fulfills political goals of ideological guidance but aims to meet prodevelopment economic
goals by maneuvering cultural assets to realize the entrepreneurial city idea and practice.
Second, despite rising strategic importance with prodevelopment pragmatic implications, culture
is treated as a special area of relatively low importance. The status of MUSC as a separate section in
the Urban Planning Bureau without regular funding allocation mirrors the mindset of the commu-
nist party leadership that treats culture as an add-on component. Incomplete institution building of
the urban sculpture planning authority is evident.
Third, actors in the cultural elite coalition circling around the urban sculpture planning authority
demonstrate sound art background, extensive practical experience, and sophisticated understanding
and deep reflection on public art issues. Particular importance is attached to political experience and
consultancy skills. This situation reveals high expectations on the competency of nongoverning
cultural elites in facilitating decision making and execution.
Fourth, Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996) legitimate taste of eclecticism and globalism is applicable to the
Shanghai context. Cultural elites in Shanghai demonstrate adequate intellectual sense that understands
and is concurrent with global aesthetic trends. However, unlike in other communist countries, cultural
elites in Shanghai do not lack sympathy for the local culture of Shanghai. Rather, their cultural
disposition is characterized by deep rootedness in the local culture in addition to having a global vision.
Fifth, a two-tier urban sculpture planning mechanism across the municipal and district govern-
mental levels is unique to Shanghai. MUSC conducts urban sculpture master plans, whereas DUSC
enacts detailed urban sculpture regulatory plans. Within the coalition, advice from the district urban
sculpture planning authorities is more likely to be taken by the municipal authority. Thus, bottom-
up influences across the two-tier apparatus, as the outcome of the relatively higher autonomy of the
urban sculpture planning field, have partially reshaped the vertical relationship between the muni-
cipal and district urban planning authorities.
Notes
1. Walder (1994), for instance, argues for the rise of local corporatism and care entrepreneurship in China’s
townships and villages and believes that governments at the lower levels “are able to exercise more effective
control over their assets than are governments at higher levels” (270).
2. A slight difference is noted between cultural elites and academia/intellectuals (“science researchers” and
“intellectuals”); that is, cultural elites dwell somewhere in between a narrowly defined research specialty and
the broader cultural, political, and social criticism of intellectual work. Their work is intellectual in nature and
yet highly specific and brief in duration (Crane, 1972; Rado, 1982).
3. According to Tang Shichu, an established sculptor and member, the group proposed and undertook 10
sculpture projects, including the restoration of the statues of Pushkin, Nie’er, Xian Xinghai, Xu Guangqi,
and Huang Daopo (Tang & Zhu, 1981; interview with Tang Shichu, December 12, 2013).
4. The project pertaining to Nie Er’s statue (Figure 1) required the surrounding site to be redesigned, which
involved a planning issue. Finally, a green belt was created to provide a suitable site for the statue. This project
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resulted in the governmental consensus that urban sculpture development should take place within the
framework of urban planning (interview with Tang Shichu, December 12, 2013).
5. The output of the public art planning is the “Shanghai Urban Sculpture Master Plan, 2004–2020” (Shanghai
Chengshi Diaosu Zongti Guihua), enacted in 2003 (Shanghai Municipal Government, 2003a).
6. The municipal-level urban sculpture planning committee coordinates large-scale projects across multiple
districts. For example, 2 years ago, a series of sculptures with the theme of “revolution” was planned along a
route across a few districts.
7. Chen Liangyu (1946–) acted as the secretary-general in Shanghai from 2002 to 2006. He was embroiled in the
Shanghai Social Security Incident and prosecuted for illegally appropriating public funds. When he was in
power, he upgraded the city image of Shanghai through historical building conversion and urban sculpture
development programs.
8. Wu Jiang (1960–) graduated from Tongji University and specializes in architectural history and urban planning. He
acted as the deputy head of themunicipal City Planning Bureau from 2003 to 2008 and is currently the vice principal of
Tongji University. He played a key role in sculpture and historical building conservation projects in Shanghai.
9. The municipal urban sculpture master plan was completed and implemented in 2004. Ten inner-city districts
completed their urban sculpture plans in 2006 and 2007.
10. Huangpu District urban sculpture planning was formally initiated in Huangpu District in 2006 (interview with
an official at Huangpu District, October 10, 2013).
11. Members of the committee have overlaps in identity; for example, simultaneously academia and artist.
12. “Publicness” is defined as the nature of engagement with the personal interests and wider cultural patterns that
mark out civic life (Miles et al., 2000).
13. The chief official of MUSCO is clear about this process because the Luwan District’s experimental initiative was
the first project that he oversaw after MUSCO was merged with the Urban Planning Bureau (interview with the
chief official of MUSCO, December 2013; Luwan District Urban Planning and Management Bureau & Tongji
University Urban Planning and Design Institute, December 16, 2013).
14. Chen Yi (1901–1972) was the first Shanghai mayor.
15. The “two-option” insight came from the sculpture officials’ past experience. MUSCO used to submit only one
artwork to political leaders. One time, one leader asked with a smile, “Why don’t you give me two options for
selection?” Since then, two options have been presented.
16. MUSCO is responsible for cross-district sculpture projects and key projects within historic districts; the
municipal government leaders assign projects (interview with a government official of MUSCO, 2003).
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